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Abstract 
Social attentional biases are a core component of social anxiety disorder, but research has not 
yet determined their direction due to methodological limitations. Here we present preliminary 
findings from a novel, dynamic eye-tracking paradigm allowing spatial-temporal 
measurement of attention and gaze-following, a mechanism previously unexplored in social 
anxiety. 105 participants took part, with those high (N = 27) and low (N = 25)  in social 
anxiety traits (HSA and LSA respectively) entered into the analyses. Participants watched a 
video of an emotionally-neutral social scene, where two actors periodically shifted their gaze 
towards the periphery. HSA participants looked more at the actors’ faces during the initial 2s 
than the LSA group but there were no group differences in proportion of first fixations to the 
face or  latency to first fixate the face, although HSA individuals’ first fixations to the face 
were shorter. No further differences in eye movements were found, nor in gaze-following 
behaviour, although these null effects could potentially result from the relatively small 
sample. Findings suggest attention is biased towards faces in HSA individuals during initial 
scene inspection, but that overt gaze-following may be impervious to individual differences 
in social anxiety. Future research should seek to replicate these effects. 
Keywords: Attentional bias, Social phobia, Social attention, Threat detection, Gaze cueing 
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Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a prevalent, debilitating anxiety disorder, 
characterized by an intense fear of scrutiny and negative social evaluation (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Individuals with SAD typically avoid social or performance-
based situations where possible, to reduce the fear of potential social rejection or humiliation 
(Bögels et al., 2010). It has been found that individuals experiencing social anxieties are 
unlikely to seek help for their symptoms (Weiller, Bisserbe, Boyer, Lepine, & Lecrubier, 
1996). Coupled with the suggestion that SAD represents only the extreme end of the 
spectrum of social anxiety (SA) symptomology, it is likely that undiagnosed SAD may be 
common in the general population (Ruscio, 2010; Weiller et al., 1996). 
 
Attentional biases appear to be a core component of SAD. Empirical research and 
cognitive models place emphases on atypical attentional processes in the disorder  (Bögels & 
Mansell, 2004; Clark & Wells, 1995).  In addition, recent therapeutic interventions for the 
condition have focused on modifying attentional processes to reduce anxiety, with some 
success (Davidson et al., 2004; Fistikci, Saatcioğlu, Keyvan, Kalkan, & Topçuoğlu, 2015). 
However, despite the established link between SAD and attention and an active research 
community in the field, it is surprising that a consensus as to the precise nature of these biases 
has yet to be reached.  
 
In other research fields, the term “social attention” is often to describe the 
mechanisms by which social stimuli both attract and direct our attention, and these two 
mechanisms have often been examined together in both non-clinical participants and those 
with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Nasiopolous, 
Risko, & Kingstone, 2015). Whilst in non-clinical participants, faces usually attract attention 
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and fixations towards them (Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008; Smilek, Birmingham, 
Cameron, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2006), a shift of eye-gaze direction of a social partner often 
causes a corresponding shift in attention away from the face, in the direction  of gaze, —so-
called “gaze following.”  Gaze following is the first manifestation of theory of mind abilities 
in infants and as such is critical to successful social developmental (Carpenter, Nagell, & 
Tomasello, 1998; Morissette, Ricard, & Décarie, 1995).   Although reporting equivocal 
findings, studies finding atypicalities in attention to social stimuli are certainly well-
documented in SAD. Surprisingly however, the gaze following mechanism has never been 
studied in this group.  
 
Attentional biases in social anxiety 
 
Of the two main competing theoretical accounts of attentional biases towards social 
stimuli in SA,  one suggests SA individuals are vigilant for threatening social stimuli such as 
angry faces, resulting in increased attention toward them (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The 
other asserts that people with SA avoid social stimuli (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002; 
Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001) which may serve as a safety behaviour by reducing potential 
for negative emotional experience . Eye contact in particular is avoided in SA (Horley, 
Williams, Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2003, 2004). These discrepant findings have been explained 
in terms of a vigilance-avoidance model: An initial bias towards, followed by subsequent 
avoidance (Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004; Mogg, 
Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997). Other researchers suggest that SA individuals experience 
difficulty disengaging attention from threatening cues, resulting in increased attention 
towards stimuli over time, referred to as a maintenance of attention (Buckner, Maner, & 
Schmidt, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
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The dot-probe task 
The dot-probe task has been a widely used paradigm to study attentional bias in SAD 
(Bantin, Stevens, Gerlach, & Hermann, 2016). A common finding is that SA participants are 
quicker to correctly detect the probe when it replaces a face showing angry expressions, 
compared to neutral expressions supporting vigilance or hypervigilance for social threat 
(Klumpp & Amir, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004). Other 
work has shown a  failure to disengage attention from such stimuli, supporting a maintenance 
hypothesis  (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003; Buckner et al., 2010).  To add further 
confusion, other dot-probe studies have shown SA individuals avoid faces altogether in 
favour of non-social stimuli (Chen et al., 2002; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999).  
An important limitation of the task is that it provides only a snapshot of behavioural 
response to the stimulus at one time point (Klumpp & Amir, 2009). To counter this, some 
researchers have varied the duration of stimulus presentation (Mogg, Philippot, et al., 2004; 
Stevens, Rist, & Gerlach, 2009) but this still limits temporal analysis to discrete, pre-defined 
time bins created a priori. Even with such modifications, the dot-probe task has been found to 
be an unreliable measure of attentional bias in SA, and one which may be uncorrelated with 
SA symptomology (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014). Eye-movement 
based paradigms have been employed in an attempt to overcome these limitations, as they are 
capable of measuring attention over both space and time. 
Eye-movement based paradigms 
A review of  eye-tracking tasks in affective disorders (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012) 
highlighted that hypervigilance is typically operationalised by examining the initial fixations 
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directed towards stimuli (Armstrong, Olatunji, Sarawgi, & Simmons, 2010) avoidance by 
reduced early fixations to stimuli over longer periods (Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Rinck 
& Becker, 2006) and maintenance by longer/more frequent fixations to stimuli after initial 
orienting (Buckner et al., 2010).  
However, operationalised definitions do vary considerably across studies, leaving 
open different interpretations of results. As with the dot-probe task, one problem is the 
limited (around 2 seconds) temporal window that analyses are usually conducted within. As 
an example, the only study to examine attentional bias to (static) emotionally neutral social 
stimuli , Garner, Mogg and Bradley (2006), considered only the properties of the first fixation 
occurring within a 1500ms trial. The parameters of this fixation were taken to evaluate the 
vigilance, avoidance and maintenance hypotheses (indicated by first fixation location, latency 
and duration). Interestingly, the direction of the attentional bias seemed dependent on 
whether participants were in a high or low stress condition, with avoidance and vigilance 
resulting, respectively. However, it is unlikely that a solitary fixation could validly assess 
either maintenance or avoidance theories given both hinge on changes in attention over time. 
Other researchers have employed a more sensitive approach by analysing changes in 
individual fixations during scene inspection but again this is usually limited to a 2 second 
period (Amir et al., 2003; Buckner et al., 2010). Waechter et al (2014) were the only authors 
to examine a longer period of 5s separated into 500ms epochs. Interestingly, they found that 
HSA individuals looked more at angry faces but only between 1000-2000ms after stimulus 
presentation, which would better support a maintenance of attention, rather than a 
hypervigilance hypothesis. 
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In their review,  Armstrong and Olatunji (2012) concluded that although many  
studies did support an initial hypervigilance for threat, in light of such equivocal findings 
supporting maintenance and avoidance theories, “further insight into the time course and 
components of attentional bias  [in affective disorders] may require a broader set of tools for 
measuring attention [than currently utilised]” (p.705). Despite the rich data available to eye-
tracking researchers, and six subsequent years of research, it seems that the potential for this 
method has still yet to be realised.  
Whilst this may be the case in the affective disorders, studies of typical social 
attention have begun to employ more complex stimuli to increase ecological validity (Gobel, 
Kim, & Richardson, 2015; Gregory et al., 2015; Laidlaw, Foulsham, Kuhn, & Kingstone, 
2011) as is true in the ASD literature (Auyeung et al., 2015; Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 
2013). As a result, subtle group differences have emerged. For example Freeth et al. (2010) 
demonstrated delayed fixations to faces embedded within everyday scenes in ASD, an effect 
which  was visible only in the early stages of viewing, whilst a recent review and meta-
analysis found that sufficient social complexity of stimuli was critical to highlighting 
atypicalities in the ASD (Chita-Tegmark, 2016). 
Within the SAD literature, the only eye-tracking study to use dynamic complex social 
stimuli surprisingly did not conduct temporal data analyses (Chen, Thomas, Clarke, Hickie, 
& Guastella, 2015). SAD participants looked less at the positive and negative faces of 
audience members whilst giving a four minute speech than controls, suggesting some 
avoidance, but no differences in gaze were found during an initial period where the audience 
maintained neutral expressions. However, given the lack of fine-grained temporal analyses, 
meaningful evaluation of the competing theoretical accounts is again difficult.  
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Despite a wealth of research into attentional bias in SA, it is still not known how 
attention is deployed dynamically during social scenarios. As such, the current study charted 
the eye movements of individuals with low and high levels of SA (LSA and HSA 
respectively) whilst they viewed an emotionally-neutral, social scene  (Gregory et al., 2015). 
In order to assess the vigilance, avoidance and maintenance hypotheses we conducted both 
temporal and spatial analysis of  eye-movements. Given the task has not previously been used  
with this group, we did not make any specific predictions based on the three prominent 
theories of attentional bias in SA. Rather, our aim was to assess how attention unfolded under 
free-viewing of an everyday social scene, and determine the basic eye movement 
characteristics of participants high in SA,  an endeavour not previously attempted. 
The current paradigm not only allows for measurement of attention towards social 
stimuli but also gaze-following, a mechanism which has not previously been explored in SA. 
Gaze-following and social anxiety 
Many studies have shown that direct gaze is avoided in SAD due to its potential as a 
threatening cue (Clark & Wells, 1995; Horley et al., 2004; Roelofs et al., 2010). Yet viewing 
someone’s averted gaze, which has been repeatedly shown to cause an obligatory reorienting 
of attention in nonclinical individuals (Driver et al., 1999; Kuhn & Benson, 2007) has never 
been investigated in SA. Schmitz et al. (2012) found enhanced event related potentials 
(ERPs) in SA individuals when viewing averted eye-gaze but did not measure gaze-following 
per se. Given averted gaze indicates attention has been directed away from the observer, the 
authors suggested the effect may reflect a negative self-evaluation caused by apparent 
disinterest of the stimulus in the observer.  
Individuals with high trait anxiety may be more prone to having their attention 
oriented by eye-gaze under certain conditions than those without (e.g. with fearful faces; 
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(Fox, Mathews, Calder, & Yiend, 2007)) but as above, previous tasks have lacked in 
ecological validly in several respects.  First, rather than taking the behavioural response of an 
imitative gaze shift in the direction of the cue as a measure of gaze-following, the “gaze-
cueing task”, a variant of the Posner cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980) takes “cueing” or 
“congruency” reaction time effects as the dependent measure (the difference in manual or 
saccadic response times to cued versus uncued targets). In fact, participants are rarely found 
to make imitative eye movements in such tasks, questioning whether such designs are 
measuring gaze-following at all (Gregory & Hodgson, 2012; Kuhn & Benson, 2007). Second, 
the task has been repeatedly shown to be insensitive to group membership in ASD studies 
(Kuhn et al., 2010; Kylliainen & Hietanen, 2004; Swettenham, Condie, Campbell, Milne, & 
Coleman, 2003) despite atypical gaze-following being frequent in naturalistic settings in ASD 
(Leekam, Hunnisett, & Moore, 1998). Third, the stimuli themselves lack natural complexity, 
at best showing photographs (Gregory & Hodgson, 2012) and at worst, schematic drawings 
(e.g. (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998)). It has been questioned whether the resulting cueing 
effects are reflecting social processes at all given other non-social directional cues produce 
similar results (Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009; Tipples, 2002). These concerns led some to 
develop more naturalistic tasks (Gallup, Chong, & Couzin, 2012; Gregory et al., 2015). Using 
the current paradigm with non-clinical participants, Gregory et al., (2015) showed that 
participants overtly followed gaze around 30% of the time, which, contrary to findings from 
the gaze-cueing literature , suggests that in natural contexts gaze-following is far from 
obligatory .  
Given gaze-following has never been studied in SA, our hypothesis was two-tailed. If 
HSA individuals interpret the cue in a negative, self-referential manner (Schmitz et al., 2012) 
they may follow gaze more than LSA individuals. Alternatively, if those high in SA avoid 
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gaze (Roelofs et al., 2010), they may fail to notice the shifts and therefore may follow gaze 
less. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Students and participant pool members from  Bournemouth University volunteered to 
take part in exchange for £5 or course credit. All had normal or corrected to normal vision 
and declared themselves to be free of neurological disorder. 105 participants took part in the 
study (M age: 19.91 years, SD: 2.50) of (88 females). Data collection was conducted at 
Bournemouth University. Five participants were excluded due to poor calibration of the eye 
tracker. Post-experiment, the top quartile of participants, based on their score on the 
Leibowitz Social Anxiety scale (LSAS; (Liebowitz, 1987) (see below) were assigned to the 
high social anxiety group (HSA; N = 27; Mean LSAS score = 78.93 SE= 2.78, 25 females) 
and the bottom quartile to the low social anxiety group (LSA; N = 27; Mean LSAS score = 
26.63, SE = 1.10,  23 females).  The mean score of the HSA group on the LSAS was above 
the thresholds considered to indicate both SAD (30 or above) and its generalised sub-type (60 
or above) which is the more severe of the two presentations (Mennin et al., 2002). 
Independent samples t-test showed LSAS scores were significantly different between groups, 
t (52) = 17.46, p < .001. The remaining participants’ data were excluded from the subsequent 
analyses. The study was approved by the ethics committee of Bournemouth University (IDs 
1883 and 4928). 
 
Stimulus, Materials and Apparatus 
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Participants completed the LSAS as a measure of trait social anxiety. The LSAS is a 
24-item instrument often used by clinicians to screen for SAD. Participants rate their fear or 
avoidance of social and performance situations on a scale of 0-3, with higher ratings 
indicating greater fear or avoidance.  The LSAS has excellent psychometric properties, with 
Cronbach’s alpha of .95 in SAD patients and .92 in nonclinical participants (Fresco et al., 
2001). Test-retest reliability it also good at r = .82 (Baker, Heinrichs, Kim, & Hofmann, 
2002). 
The stimulus was that used by Gregory et al (2015). Briefly, it comprised of a two 
minute video depicting two females sitting in a waiting room, who shifted their gaze on five 
occasions towards anticipated events or objects in the periphery. The actors interacted with 
one another briefly on only two occasions. Otherwise, the actors remained seated, reading 
magazines or interacting with mobile phones, maintaining neutral facial expressions. The 
sound track was removed from the video.  
Eye movements were recorded using the Eyelink 1000 desk-mounted eye tracker (SR 
Research, Canada). Participants sat 60cm from the display screen, a 22” ProNitron 21/750 
CRT monitor, connected to a HP Compaq dc7800 display computer which was connected to 
a Dell Optiplex 760 host computer. Participants’ faces were stabilised by a chin rest. Pupil 
and corneal reflection were recorded monocularly at a rate of 2000Hz.   
Procedure 
Participants gave written informed consent to participate and provided basic 
demographic information. They were then seated in front of the eye tracker, where a 9-point 
calibration procedure was conducted. Participants were informed that a video would be 
displayed on the screen and that they should watch this until it finished, without any specific 
viewing instructions. Immediately prior to the onset of the video, a drift correct procedure 
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was carried out which identified any eye drift post-calibration. The video was then presented 
at 720 x 400 pixels resolution. Participants completed the LSAS and were verbally debriefed. 
 
 
Results 
Eye movement measures 
We elected to examine a range of eye movement measures in this study to allow us to assess 
the presence of hypervigilance/vigilance, maintenance and/or avoidant viewing strategies 
within our sample. To examine hypervigilance, we analysed characteristics of the first 
fixation made by participants after the onset of the stimulus in line with previous research 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Armstrong et al., 2010; Garner et al., 2006). Specifically, we 
assessed the proportion of first fixations made to the face of the actor. If this figure was 
significantly higher for the HSA group, this would support a hypervigilance explanation. 
Second, we also assessed the first fixation duration of those initial fixations made to the 
face. In the eye movement version of the dot-probe task,  longer first fixation durations in 
HSA individuals have been suggested to demonstrate a maintenance of attention on the 
stimulus, whereas shorter fixation durations have been taken to indicate avoidance 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Garner et al., 2006). A related measure of hypervigilance, but 
one which is rarely reported in eye movement studies of anxiety (Armstrong & Olatunji, 
2012) was the latency to first fixate the face. Again, a significantly shorter latency would 
indicate a hypervigilance whereas a longer latency may suggest avoidance. 
As the current paradigm uses a dynamic stimulus, it permits the analysis of unfolding 
attention allocation over time. We therefore analysed the proportion of dwell time to the face 
over the early part of the scene to determine the presence of maintenance or avoidance of the 
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face in the HSA group (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Buckner et al., 2010; Rinck & Becker, 
2006). Dwell time is a measure of eye movement samples falling within particular interest 
area over a defined period of time. The higher the proportion of dwell time, the higher the 
attentional priority of that area. The maximum period of initial scene viewing to be 
previously assessed in a HSA sample has been 5 s (Waechter et al., 2014), whereas 2 s has 
been a more commonly used time frame (Amir et al., 2003; Buckner et al., 2010).  Therefore 
we divided the data into ten 500ms time bins from 0 to 5000ms and analysed dwell time to 
the face over the initial 2s period and the initial 5s period to allow us to map changes in 
attention over this critical time period and to allow comparison to the previous literature.  
Finally to provide an overall assessment of the eye movements of participants over the entire 
scene, we analysed overall proportion of dwell time to each interest area (faces, bodies, 
background). Differences in dwell time particularly to the face between the groups over the 
whole scene might support a maintenance or avoidance interpretation (Chen et al., 2015).  
We also analysed some basic eye movement characteristics of the participants over the whole 
trial. Differences between  the groups might indicate more global differences in attentional 
style which are not necessarily dependent on the specific content of the scene. 
In basic eye movement research, shorter fixation durations are reported with increased scene 
complexity or expertise (Holmqvist et al., 2011) and in social settings, shorter fixations are 
observed when viewing others in a live context compared with when viewed as a pre-
recording (Gregory & Antolin, 2018) and are shorter in people with social anxiety (Horley et 
al., 2003). This suggests that as the social and/or cognitive demands of a situation increase, 
fixation durations reduce. We therefore might expect to find shorter fixation durations for the 
HSA group. In addition, those who are socially anxious have longer scanpaths than those who 
are not, and this has been interpreted as being a marker of a vigilant viewing strategy referred 
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to as “hyperscanning”. (Chen et al., 2015; Holmqvist et al., 2011; Horley et al., 2003). A 
longer scanpath could be the result of larger amplitude saccades, more frequent 
saccades/fixations and/or shorter duration fixations or a combination thereof.  Therefore in 
order to precisely isolate any differences between the groups, as well as analysing mean 
fixation duration and total scanpath length, we additionally analysed total number of 
fixations and mean saccade amplitude between the groups across the whole trial 
 
Data handling 
The stimulus was divided into interest areas (IAs) and data was analysed using 
Dataviewer (SR Research, Canada). IAs were faces and bodies of the actors, as well as the 
targets of the gaze shifts (e.g. a  door, a bookshelf) the latter being relevant only to the gaze 
following analyses, together with a rectangular IA which encompassed the whole video 
window . For the general viewing analyses, the background IA constituted this whole video 
area minus the social IAs (faces and bodies), but included the gaze target IAs described above 
(Gregory et al., 2015).  
Outlier handling 
For each variable calculated, we considered outlying data points to be those which we 
more than 1.5 times the interquartile range for that variable. Rather than removing 
participants’ data, we Winsorized (Tukey, 1962) individual outlying data points to  maximise 
the data available for analysis. Winsorizing involves amended outlying data points to the 
nearest value which is not an outlier. This procedure was carried out on a total of 45 data 
points across all analyses, representing only 3.97 % of data points. 
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All post-hoc tests presented are Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons. 
Huynh-Feldt corrected values are reported for variables with three or more levels. 
First fixations to face   
To examine possible hypervigilance, an independent samples t-test was conducted on the 
proportion of first fixations which were directed to the face between the groups. 
There was no difference between groups, t (52) = .945, p = .349, d = .257,  despite a higher 
mean for the LSA group (M = .815, SE = .076) compared to the HSA group (M = .704, SE = 
.090) 
Of the first fixations which landed on the face, the fixation durations of the HSA 
group were significantly shorter than those of the LSA group,  t (28.68) = 2.221, p = .034, d = 
.677 (HSA:  M = 353.63ms, SE = 40.82; LSA: M = 578.59ms, SE = 92.68). However there 
was no group difference in the mean latency to first fixate the face,  t (52) = .905, , d = .003 
 
Dwell time to face during initial 2 seconds 
A 2  (Group: LSA, HSA) x 4 (Time: 0-500ms, 500-1000ms, 1000-1500ms, 1500-
2000ms) mixed ANOVA was conducted on proportion of dwell time to the face over the first 
2 seconds of the scene. A significant effect of Time emerged, F (2.77, 144.22) = 12.99, p < 
.001, η2p = .200 as well as a significant effect of Group, F (1, 52) = 5.48, p = .023, η
2
p = .095. 
The HSA group spent more dwell time on the face than the LSA group (LSA: M = .523, SE = 
.045; HSA:  M  = .672, SE = .045)   The interaction between Group and Time was not 
significant, F (2.77, 144.22)  = .39, p = .746, η2p = .007.  
Dwell time to face during initial 5 seconds 
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We then conducted the same analysis but this time over the first 5 seconds using a 2 
(Group) x 10  (Time: 0-500ms, 500-1000ms, 1000-1500ms, 1500-2000ms, 2000-2500ms, 
2500-3000ms, 3000-3500ms, 3500-4000ms, 4000-4500ms, 4500-5000ms) mixed ANOVA. 
There was still a main effect of Time, F (6.39, 332.73) = 4.811, p < .001, η2p = .085, 
but the effect of Group was no longer significant, F (1, 52) = 1.65, p = .204, η2p = .031. The 
interaction was non-significant, , F (6.39, 332.73) = .574, p = .762, η2p = .011. 
The results demonstrate that any differences between groups in dwell time to the face 
were limited to the first 2 seconds. The time course of dwell time to the face in the two 
groups over the first five seconds of the scene can be seen in Figure 1. 
[insert figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of dwell time directed to the face in the LSA and HSA groups over the 
first 5 seconds of the scene.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
  
General viewing behaviour over the full trial period.   
Although our particular period of interest was early in the scene we also wished to compare 
the groups in terms of their general viewing behaviour and eye movement characteristics.  
However, we found no differences between the groups in terms of fixation number (t (52) = 
.201, p = .841, d = .082,), fixation duration (t (52) = .399, p = .692, d = .108), saccade 
amplitude (t (52) = .533, p = .596, d = .154) and scanpath length (t (52) = .520, p = .570 d = 
.145,)  over the whole trial..   
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Finally to examine attention allocation different areas of the scene over the full trial period, 
over the whole scene, we conducted a further ANOVA on proportion of dwell time data from 
the full video period, which revealed a main effect of IA, F ( 1.807, 93.955) = 78.764, p < 
.001 η2p = .602, with greater dwell time to heads, followed by bodies, followed by 
background (ps < .006). There was no effect of group, F (1, 52) = 1.254, p = .268, η2p = .024. 
and the interaction was not significant, F (1.807, 93.955) = 1.153, p = .316, η2p = .024. 
Gaze-following.   
Participants followed 28% of the gaze shifts, with a rate of 34.07% (SE = 5.53) in the 
LSA group compared to 29.63% (SE = 5.67) in the HSA group, however an independent t-
test showed that this apparent difference was not significant, t (52) = .560, p = .578, d = .152. 
As well as measuring overt saccadic responses to the gaze shifts of the actors, we also 
examined the amount of dwell time allocated to the gaze target before and after the gaze shift 
(see Gregory et al., 2015) as an average across all shifts. If participants spent more time 
looking at the target area after the shift (all of which were non-social in nature and should not 
be expected to attract a significant number of  fixations), this would be taken to indicate that 
attention had been biased to that area. This would capture any gaze-elicited orienting that 
may not take the form of a direct saccade from the actor to the target and would therefore be 
missed in the first analysis. 
 A mixed 2 (Group: LSA, HSA) x 2 (period: pre-shift; post-shift) ANOVA showed a main 
effect of Period F (1, 52) = 46.40, p < .001, η2p = .472, with participants looking more to the 
IA after the gaze shifts than before them. However the effect of Group F (1, 52) = .034, p = 
.254, η2p = .001 and the interaction, F (1, 52) = .903, p = .346, η
2
p = .017 were not significant. 
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Taken together, the results suggest there were no differences in gaze following between the 
groups. 
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Discussion 
This study set out to find evidence for the competing theories of attentional bias in 
social anxiety using a novel naturalistic eye-movement task where actors in a social scene 
maintained neutral facial expressions. It further aimed to assess for the first time the gaze-
following mechanism in SA. 
Our results are the first to demonstrate how attentional biases develop over time in 
HSA individuals in a naturalistic, neutral social scene. HSA participants allocated more 
attention to the face than those with low SA, during the first two seconds of the scene. 
However, there were no differences in the number of  first fixations landing on the face 
between the groups and the time to first fixate the face was equivalent between groups. 
However we did find that where the first fixation was to the face, the HSA participants’ 
fixation durations were significantly shorter than those in the LSA group.  However,  there 
were no differences between the groups’ general eye movement characteristics (fixation 
duration, fixation number, scanpath length) or social viewing behaviour in the remainder of 
the task, with the majority of fixations directed towards faces in both groups. 
If we accept the operationalised definitions of attentional components (Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012), our results do not appear to support a hypervigilance of social attention in the 
HSA group:  we found no group difference in proportion of first fixations to faces which also 
did not differ in latency. Despite this, increased subsequent fixations to faces in the HSA 
group suggest maintenance of attention, that is, a failure to disengage fixations from this most 
salient social stimulus. This persisted only in the early phase of the scene (2 seconds), with 
viewing behaviour equivalent thereafter, with faces fixated more than any other region, 
regardless of social anxiety levels which is consistent with the previous study using this task 
with nonclinical participants (Gregory et al., 2015).  
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This increased early bias towards faces concords to an extent with results of Waechter 
et al.’s  (2014) time-course analysis, which although involved only static images, found a 
dwell time bias towards (angry) faces in HSA participants between  1000 and 2000ms. 
However, contrary to a number of previous studies (Chen et al., 2015, 2002; Mansell et al., 
1999) we found little evidence of avoidance of faces in the HSA group, which might be 
accounted for in part by the neutral  valence of our social stimulus, or alternatively our 
interpretation of avoidance. If we based all of our interpretations upon first fixation 
parameters (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Garner et al., 2006) we could interpret the shorter 
first fixation durations on the face in the HSA group as avoidance. Clearly this would make 
little sense in the context of the other results presented here which show a clear, initial bias 
towards the face in the HSA group followed by equivalent eye movement behaviour between 
groups thereafter, taken from multiple eye movement measures.  This highlights the 
vulnerability of data to misinterpretation, particularly when only a limited number of 
parameters are analysed. Rather than avoidance per se (these participants were after all, 
looking at the face within a complex scene in their first fixation), the shorter first face 
fixations of the HSA group may well reflect  faster processing  of this potentially aversive 
stimulus. It is possible that all that needs to be gleaned from the face of a stranger can be 
achieved in far shorter a time by individuals who are socially anxious if that face may pose a 
potential threat. This could be considered in some way to reflect hypervigilance of a sort.  
That shorter fixation durations over the whole trial were not a feature of the HSA group, 
demonstrates that whatever was driving this early difference subsided over time, as with our 
other measures,  and was therefore not a feature of a general cognitive or physiological 
difference between the groups.  Similarly, we did not find any evidence for the hyperscanning 
viewing strategy reported elsewhere. Participants’ total scanpath lengths, saccade amplitudes, 
number of fixations as well as the previously mentioned fixation durations were equivalent 
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between groups. The reason for this may be the neutral valence of the scene and/or the 
limited number of actors present. The most comparable study to the current research 
presented participants with an array of faces which gave positive, negative or neutral facial 
feedback to participants dynamically over the trial (Chen et al., 2015). In such a scenario, 
scanning from face to face would be expected if participants were continually monitoring for 
threat. In our stimulus, as the two individuals sat close to one another, it may have been 
possible for ongoing threat detection to occur without the need for continuous scanning of the 
scene. 
To summarise, our data support an early bias towards faces in SA, with potentially 
faster processing of the face in the first fixation, which might support a maintenance 
hypothesis, but we found little evidence for either hypervigilance or avoidance by current 
definitions.  
The processing of neutral social stimuli in SAD has been largely overlooked in 
previous research. But our results concord to an extent with those of Garner et al. (2006) who 
showed that under low stress conditions, HSA individuals were biased towards rather than 
away from neutral, static faces compared to objects. In addition,  Chen et al. (2015) showed 
that even in a higher stress scenario and over longer periods (50sec), SA did not modulate 
gaze behaviour when the dynamic stimuli were emotionally-neutral, which is consistent with 
our full video analysis. Taken together, our results suggest that SA causes an additional, early 
prioritisation of faces, which returns to typical levels over time. Given this occurred within a 
neutral scenario, a possible explanation is that initially gaze was biased to faces to monitor 
for threat and when none was detected, this bias diminished. The results from the current 
study,  which were obtained under low stress conditions may add further to the suggestion 
that social stress may impact on the direction of attentional biases, as avoidance of faces has 
only emerged in previous studies under high stress conditions and typically with negative 
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stimuli (Chen et al., 2015; Garner et al., 2006; Mansell et al., 1999). This clearly requires 
further investigation as we did not manipulate either emotion of the stimuli or stress within 
the current study. 
Our results provide no evidence for differences in gaze-following in SA. All 
participants overtly followed the gaze shifts around 30% of the time and spent more time 
attending to the gazed-at targets after the gaze shift than before, suggesting a gaze-induced 
shift of overt attention.  To our knowledge the current paradigm is the only one to be 
employed to examine naturalistic gaze following (Gregory et al., 2015). The phenomenon has 
been previously investigated using the gaze cueing paradigm (Driver et al., 1999; Kuhn & 
Benson, 2007) where any  effect of gaze is only attentional (faster processing of the cued 
location) rather than behavioural, as participants rarely make overt eye movements in the 
direction of these cues in such tasks (Gregory & Hodgson, 2012; Kuhn & Benson, 2007). Not 
even this gaze cueing effect has been previously studied in social anxiety, although one study 
with participants with generalised anxiety suggested those participants were more influenced 
by the gaze cues of fearful faces (Fox et al., 2007). As our stimuli were neutral, rather than 
threatening, this may provide an explanation for our different results. However, many 
researchers have questioned the validity of the gaze cueing paradigm citing concerns of poor 
ecological validity leading to a paradigm which may have little social relevance at all 
(Gregory et al., 2015). This issue can be no more pertinent than when considering it in terms 
of behaviour in social anxiety where the social context is the critical variable. It has recently 
been suggested that overt gaze following of the sort examined here may be impervious to top-
down influences and individual differences and may instead represent an automatic 
oculomotor stimulus-response association developed early in life from repeated exposure to 
the stimulus and the rewarding consequences of attending to it (Cole, Smith, & Atkinson, 
2015; Gregory, Hermens, Facey, & Hodgson, 2016). As one previous ERP study showed 
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differences in neural responses in those high in SA in response to averted eye gaze (Schmitz 
et al., 2012), future studies might consider examining the reward value placed on gazed-at 
objects by participants rather than the orienting response per se when investigating potential 
differences between groups in this behaviour.  
 
 Limitations, Future directions and Clinical implications 
The current paradigm can be adapted to further probe the conditions under which 
these attentional biases in SA occur.  Future research should assess the influence of emotional 
context and stress on the direction of attentional biases and further explore our suggestion for 
investigating more subtle differences in gaze following behaviour.  Whilst a core strength of 
this study is its novel approach, the merit of this must be weighed against the relatively small 
sample size included in the analyses. This was due to participants scoring within the 
interquartile range of social anxiety being excluded in order to achieve high and low scoring 
groups. In an underpowered study there is a decreased likelihood of detecting small effects 
and an increased risk of Type II and Type I errors (Christley, 2010) together with the 
possibility of inflated effect sizes (Gelman & Weakliem, 2009).  Particularly pertinent to the 
current study, we found several null effects which have the potential to be the results of Type 
II errors. Although the effects we anticipated based on the previous available research were 
moderate rather than small (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012)it is still possible that the 
suboptimal power of the study failed to detect genuine effects. In order to add further support 
to our results and in line with the continuing discussion within the scientific community about 
the (lack of) replicability of research (Lindsay, 2015; Munafò et al., 2017; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015), a larger scale replication of this study would be beneficial. 
 
NATURALISTIC SOCIAL ATTENTION IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 
25 
 
 
Our results suggest that HSA individuals may struggle to disengage attention from 
faces in neutrally valenced social situations, when those with LSA have already shifted their 
attention away from the face. This may mean that those with HSA might be more likely to 
notice delayed or fleeting negative facial expressions, which LSA people would miss and 
therefore be untroubled by. Additionally, this may result in HSA individuals performing less 
well socially, due to missing important relational information in the form of body language 
such as posture (de Gelder, 2009). As well as generating anxiety in social situations, failure to 
disengage from faces may also make social competency more difficult. The likely negative 
impact of safety behaviours on social competency has been addressed in several accounts of 
SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Wong & Rapee, 2016). However, the potentially unhelpful 
impact of socio-attentional factors such as difficulty in disengaging attention from faces has 
not, to date, been addressed in models of SAD or tested empirically. These effects should be 
investigated in help-seeking SAD samples, and if found to be relevant, attentional guidance 
and practice could be used to alter these biases and any negative outcomes associated with 
them. Attentional training as an adjunct to more established psychosocial interventions has 
already shown some promise (Fistikci et al., 2015) and the findings of the current study may 
lead to improvements in this approach.  
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Conclusion 
Our primary aim in this study was to assess the hypervigilance, avoidance and maintenance 
hypotheses of attentional bias in SAD, but in doing do we highlighted inconsistencies in 
operationalising these components. Although we found that HSA individuals fixated more on 
faces in the early stages of our task, we are reluctant to interpret this too definitively as 
vigilance or maintenance of attention, given the lack of consensus around definitions. It may 
therefore be more fruitful, here and in future work, to interpret findings in terms of the 
direction and duration of attentional biases more objectively rather than via poorly defined 
concepts.  
However, one consistency in previous SAD research appears to be the almost 
exclusive use of static stimuli, which is surprising given the dynamic processes under 
investigation. This was a limitation which we began to address here. However, if cognitive 
psychology is to have a meaningful impact on treatment of SAD, it should strive to conduct 
research which genuinely reflects real-life social experiences of sufferers. This is an 
important endeavour because a substantial minority of people with SAD do not respond to the 
current, most effective treatments (Acarturk, Cuijpers, van Straten, & de Graaf, 2009; 
Davidson et al., 2004). Looking outside traditional experimental methods is a solution worthy 
of serious consideration. 
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